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I.

INTRODUCTION: ST. THOMAS AND ARISTOTLE

There is no expression occurring with greater frequency in the works
of st. Thomas than dicit Philosophus.

Yet his use of the authority of

Aristotle must have given him many uneasy moments.

In following it he

was going counter to the philosophical tradition founded on St. Augustine
and espousing a philosopher whose adaptability to the Christian faith
was a matter or considerable doubt.

But the Augustinian philosophy. as

st. Thomas well realized, embodied fundamental difficulties which :maJ::IY
centuries had f'a.iled to solve.

Though consistent in the main with

Christian theology it was at odds with itself'.

An altogether n• approach

to these underlying problems was necessary. a.n approach which St. Thomas
perceived in the recently recovered works of' Aristotle. 1

Bat the diffi-

culties before St. Thanas were not the same as those which had confronted
Aristotle. or at any rate they had a.ssum!)d entirely new proportions.
Christian Revelation and the natural course of' time had thrown into sharp
relief' certain questions which Aristotle had glimpsed in bare outline or
not at all.

It was the task of' St. Thana.s not only to resurrect Aristotle-

others could do that--but to acclimatize him to an atmosphere which was
very different from that of' ancient Greece and the shaded groves of' Athens.
otherwise Aristotle might have lived, but his existence would have been
a.n unhappy. and. as far as Christian philosophy was concerned, a fruitless

or even

~erous

one.

Before the twelfth century medie'V8.1 philosophers. with the possible
excepti an of' Scotus Erigena, had produced no unified body of' thought which

might be called a B,Ystem.

The great philosophies of antiquity

~re

lost to

them. 2 and the elements of Platonism and Aristotelianismwhich they poseeased were so incomplete and mutually contradictory that no attempt to synthetize them produced a ocanplete and coherent system of thought.

The only ele-

ment which remained more or less static during the greater part of the
Middle Ages was the philosophy which St. Augustine had built upon Plato.
and which became in time the only philosophy acceptable to the majority of
orthodox Christians.

In the time of St. Thomas the Franciscans. among whom

st. Bonaventure was outstanding, were spokesmen for the Augustinian school.
and they held with great tenacity to the conventional doctrines of the
necessity of illumination in knowledge, the essential identity of the soul
and its faculties, and the presence in man of more than one substantial
form.

In this way they believed that they had safeguarded beyond reproach

the spirituality and immortality of the human sou1. 3
The Christian world suffered a shook when, in the twelfth century • the
works of Aristotle

~re

introduced into western Europe from Spain through

the agency of the Moors and Arabians.

The system ot the Greek philosopher

contained many doctrines that were contrary to faith, or at least that
could easily be interpreted that way.

The commentaries on the text, more-

over, which in itself was not very close to the original, were tainted by
NeoplatoniSm,. determinism, and other excesses of a similar nature.

It is

little wonder that the conservatives in the universities of the west became even more steadfast in their defense of Augustinianism.

Some of the

more radical, however, accepted Aristotle just as he was offered by the
Arabians, and were not unnaturally led to profess the eternity of the world,
-2-

the impossibility of tree will, and the shadowy

~ortality

of the soul

allowed by Averroes, the commentator supreme.
But there were a few who su a third a-venue of approach to this new
problem.

Many parts of the Aristotelian system, notably the physics, were

so unquestionably better than

~hing

which had previously been known

that it seemed only a matter of time before they would win widespread acceptance.

But if this happened in opposition to the philosophers of

Christianity, it was not improbable that the less desirable elements would
be taken along with the rest, so that the triumph of the Arabian Aristotle
would be seriously detrimental to the interests of the faith.

There was,

however, a rather obvious fact which offered a bright ray of hope.

The com-

mentary of Averroes on Aristotle differed considerably from that of Avicenna
for example, and both of these were clearly distinct from the original of
Aristotle.

Thus it would seem altogether feasible that another interpreta-

tion was possible, and the most logical course was to reconcile Aristotle
with Christianity, and make him, not an enemy, but an ally.

This st.Thornas,

with the aid of translations directly from the Greek, set out to accomplish.
But it would be a mistake to think that St. Thanas, exclusi-vely as a
theologian, adapted the philosophy of Aristotle to his own preconceived
religious beliefs.

For, strictly speaking, there was no definite philosophy

of Aristotle, on many important; points at least, which he could employ.
This is attested by the fact that there were almost as many -verSions of
Aristotle in existence as there were commentators.

Even if there was

general agreement; among those who were not Augustinians that Aristotle

spoke the truth, there was the question of what Aristotle actually said.
st. Thomas had first to produce a consistent philosophical synthesis out
of the Aristotelianism which was at hand before he could place the wisdom
of the Greek at the service of theology.

Moreover, if the purpose of

st. Thomas had been exclusively theological, it is difficult to see why he
chose a course that was so definitely opposed to the ecclesiastical tradition of his day.

Certain portions of Aristotle, if not entirely ignored,

could have been interpreted more in conformity with the opinions of his
contemporaries.

But above all, the fact that st. Thomas shows suoh a

thorough understanding of the principles of Aristotle and of the Aristotelian spirit makes it most unlikely that his view-point was at all times
that of a theologian.

That philosophy is intended to serve theology he

did not doubt; but that philosophy has a definite place in the science of
thought he was equally certain. 4 The basic principles of thomism are those
of Aristotle, of a man who had never heard of the Christian Revelation,
and the synthesis of St. Thomas has purified Aristotelianism. and rendered
it complete by deducing fram its proper principles all that is logically
implied in thelll•

That St. Thomas has followed without mishap the narrow

course between the extremes of Augustinianism and Averroism is probably
5
the most outstanding manifestation of his genius.
It is the thorough sympathy of St. Thomas with Aristotle that makes
him disagree with sane of the teachings of St. Augustine just as Aristotle
had departed from certain doctrines of Plato.

Although st. Thomas appre-

ciated to a much greater extent than Aristotle Plato's attempt to create
a world of ideas in which truth and goodness are absolute, still the

confidence in the ordinary experience of men which he had in common with
Aristotle made him oppose any separation of the real and ideal worlds that
would make one e:x:ist as a mere shadow, without any of the substance., of
the other.

But .st. Thomas was assured that an abode similar to the ideal

world of Plato is the destiny of man;
his faith and his philosophy.

this was in accordance with both

Aristotle., of course, did not have the faith,

but he had a philosophy which would seem to demand such an assurance as one
of its important tenets.

The fact, however, that his system has shown it-

self capable of so many diverse interpretations demonstrates the absence of
a clear and decisive view-point an such questions as the immortality of the
soul and the end of man.

It was the task of st. Thomas., for the sake of

his faith and his philosophy, to interpret and complete the work whioh
Aristotle had begun so well in order that· there might be no doubt about
the most vital problem in the life of man and in his philosophy.
II.

6

ARISTOTLE ON THE SOUL

The theories of Aristotle were especially appealing to the mind of
St. Thomas because they fitted in with the nature of reality as it is,
not as it might be.

This is clearest perhaps in regard to the human soul.

Since man inhabits a natural and material world, it is fitting that he
possess a being that is in
e:x:i stance.

s~

way common to everything in his sphere of

But every material being is a composite, in tm Aristotelian

explanation of reality, of matter and form, of which the former is identical with potentiality., the latter with actuality.

In living beings there

is a principle which distinguishes them -from the inorganic world, and the

_,._

general term for this higher kind of form is "soul."

Thus the distinction

between a living and a non-living being has its foundatim in the form
alone 1 for it is the formwhich actuates the potencies of the indeterminate.
matter.
Man is numbered among the living composite beings, and, to preserve

uniformity in the treatment of all members of this class, his soul should
also be defined as the form of his body, "the first actuality of a natural
body having in it the capacity of life. 117

Thus Aristotle reconciles the

presence of the soul in a body which Plato declared rather a prison fran
which it were better that the soul be delivered and depart unfettered to
a life of contemplation in the world of ideas.

In the philosophy of Plato

the soul is a purely spiritual be'ing that acts as a motor of the body, and,
since its presence in the body is altogether accidental to its real nature,
the soul may be defined as the man. 8

According to Aristotle, however, man

has a natural right to exist in a material universe, and his definition
of the soul as the form of the body establishes that right.

Like all

other forms the human soul is the actuality of a particular body, and its
presence in that boqy is not only favorable to it, but demanded by its very
nature.
There is one attribute of the human soul, however 1 which distinguishes
it from lawer forms in the scale of life, a function which is not contaimd
in the potency of matter, and which is, therefore, not a.n actuality of
matter.

Aristotle is fully convinced of this, and is most severe with

those who make no distinction between the soul of man and of lawer beings.

Re criticizes the teaching of Empedocles,

9

for example, that the elements

of all material things must be in the soul in order that the soul may have
10
knew ledge o:f' them, aff'irming, on the contrary, the doctrine of .Ane.xa.goras
that the soul must be unmixed with anything else, f'or if it were itself a
body the intrusion of its own form would hinder the reception o:f' the forms
of external bodies.

ilVllile soul in general is the form o:f' a body and has

no actuality apart from its function of' aotuatiDg a bodily organ, still in
the case of the human intellect and speculative faculty it would seem that
"it alone is capable o:f' separation from the body, as that which is eternal
from that which is perishable. ull

This inbellect, which is "developed in

us as a self-existing substance, nlZ comes to us from without,

13

and it is

through it that man is able to participate in divinity. 14
Aristotle does not hesitate to emphasize his belief' that the intellect
is a substance which was not made to perish,l5 for it is the only element
in man that can exist apart from the body.

As a matter of fact, it is

only when "separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential
nature, alone is immortal and eternal." 16

The intellect cannot be destroy-

ed, far
"i:f' anything could destroy it, it would be the feebleness o:f' age. But, as things are, no doubt what occurs
is tm same as in the case o:f' the sense-organs. I:f' an
aged man could procure an eye o:f' the right sort, he
would see just as well as a young man. In like manner,
then, thought and the exercise o:f' knowledge are enfeebled through the loss of something else within, but
are in themselves impassive."l7
Doubtless, then, there is in man an element which, because of its immateriality and subsistence, is immortal.

vv.hat this element is, however,

.Aristotle is not sure, and his indecision is clearly reflected in the
notorious disagreement of his commentators throughout the subsequent history
of philosophy.
unanswered.

There are, indeed, many questions which Aristotle has left

In the first place, if the intellect comes from without, join-

ing itself' to the other potencies of' the soul, is it not possible that it
may at some time sever that connection?

This seems to be what Aristotle

holds, for even during its stay in the body, it holds aloof from the lower
activities of the soul, and might be called, in the words of Zeller, the
"universal as distinguished from the individual element in man."

18

Since

the intellect is something separate from the body,
"reasoning, love and .M.tred are not attributes of the
thinking faculty but of' its individual possessor, in so
far as he possesses it. Hence when this possessor perishes, there is neither memory nor love: for these
never did belong to the thinking faculty, but to the composite whole which has perished, while the intellect is
doubtless a thing more divine and is impassive. 11 19
Moreover 1 although this acting intellect is separable and eternal, "we do
not remember because this is impassive, while the intellect which can be
affected is perishable and without this does not think at all. 1120

All forms

of personal activity Ari·stotle refers either to the lOU'rer powers of' the
soul, which act only in conjunction with the body, or to the possible intellect, which perishes with the dissolution of the boey.

We might even

inquire of Aristotle haw thought could be considered an activity of the
separated intellect, for ''as without sensation a man would not learn or
under stand anything, so at the very time when he is actually thinking he
must have an image before him. n21
Since only the acting intellect survives the destruction of the body,

many commentators have agreed that Averroes the Arabian, whose influence
was great in the later Middle Ages, was justified in declaring that
Aristotle postulated but one intellect for all men. 22

This interpretation,

however, would· seem to oppose Aristotle's description of the acting intellect as "a distinct species of soul. n23

In his treatment of soul in

general as the principle of life, the acting intellect is distinguished
only as one kind of soul from others, and in urging man to exercise his
highest faculties Aristotle declares that the "intellectual element in
him· •• is thought to be the man himself." 24

Since, on the otmr hand, it

is a general Aristotelian principle that the ground of individual existence
is matter, it is a perplexing question whether any individuality will be
preserved in tre intellect when it has been separated from the body.

For

if the distinction of personality lies in the possible intellect and lG"ler
faculties, there will be no personality after death.

If, an the contrary,

personality is embodied in the acting intellect, which "abides immutably
within the circle of its OWlllife, without receiving impressions fromwithout or passing any part of its activity beyond itself," "untouched by
birth and death, and by the changes of the temporal li:f'e, " 25 the Mure
life holds little hope for the exercise of individual activity.

This

vagueness is characteristic not only of the physics and psychology of
Aristotle but o:f' his ethical system as well, for nowhere does he make any
provision for the highly important question of a future life or concern
himself with preparing for it.
III.

OTHER DOCTRINES ON THE SOUL

In the philosophy of St. Augustine, which held almost undisputed sway

up to the twelfth century, and whose adherents attempted in many an encounter to stem the increasing tide of Aristotelianism, there are difficulties
altogether different from those encountered by Aristotle in his theorizing
upon the nature of the soul.

At first sight the doctrine of' Plato as modi-

fied and propounded by St.Augustine would seem very promising from the
standpoint of Christian thought.

The soul is the permanent and im:rmltable

element in man, giving life to the body;

in itself' the soul is a complete

substance, radically independent of' the body. Not only is the soul indifferent to its connection with the body, but it regards the boqy more or
less as a tomb, from which it hopes some day to make its escape to the
world of ideas, where it will be confronted by the pure intelligible beings
which it knows in this world only by a sort of vague reminiscence.

The

spirituality of the soul and its immortality are so unhesitatingly presented
by Plato that the early Fathers of' the Church, anxious as they were to defend the

exi~tence

of a future life, received his assistance with open

arms. 26
There is one very important distinction, however, between the teaching
of Plato himself and the interpretation given it by the early Christians.
From Scripture had come a wonderful prophecy:

the soul of' man was to liw

forever, and joined to it in eternal life was to be the body it had upon
earth. This doctrine of' Revelation gave the body a new dignity, for Christ
Himself' had ascended into heaven after the Resurrection, the reuniting of'
His soul and body.

The coming· of Christ had brought glad tidings both

to the soul, which was thus liberated from the bondage o£ original sin, and
to the body. because by virtue of the incorruptibility of the soul it too

was to enjoy immortality.

But if the body was to be united to the soul

for all eternity through the wisdom of God, could it be thought of any
longer as a tomb, separation from which would allow the soul to attain the
fullness of its spiritual life?

How could the disjunction of soul and body

be deemed a benefit of the soul or of man if God was to make the union of
the two eternal?

It became difficult to consider the presence of the soul

in the body unnatural, and even more difficult to maintain that the soul
had a capacity for greater happiness without the body if God Himself out
of His wisdom and Providence had promised man unending happiness in the
union of body and soul.

Thus Revelation had bestowed upon the entire man

e. dignity that must be reckoned with in philosophy.

man;

it is the soul of man.

But the soul is not

The body as an essential part of the being

of man had received for all time its rightful position in the human compound.
This new teaching is reflected in St. Augustine as well as in most of
the earlier Christian thinkers.

But there was no little difficulty ex-

perienced in reconciling the philosophy of Plato to the precepts of faith.
In st. Augustine we find such statements as: "Homo igitur, ut homini
anillla rationalis est mortali e.tque terreno utens corpore."27

appa.ret~

This attitude

no doubt shews a firm intention of preserving the immortality of the soul
I

by making 'it independent of a body which is corruptible;
man seems to be placed in extreme jeopardy.

but the unity of

St. Augustine attempts to ex-

plain his position in conformity with the word of Scripture.
homo? .Anima. rational is habens corpus.

"Quid est

Anima rationalis habens corpus non

faoit duas personas. sed unum hominem." 28

But if the definition of the soul

is the same as that of man. what becomes of the unity of man which Christian
philosophy must uphold?

It is true that there is a decided improvement in

the Christian concept of the union of soul and body over that of Plato.

Man

is no longer the accidental result of the workings of nature; still less
is the compound of his being the product of violence in the order of the
universe.

St. Augustine realized that he must affirm the unity of man in a

somewhat different manner from that of Plato.
proceed.

But he was at a loss haw to

Asking himself whether body and soul are like two horses drawing

the same chariot, he cannot make a reply. 29
The contradictions encountered in the system of Plato are insurmountable
for a philosophy which accepts as fundamental the unity of man.

The only

other reputable solution to the problemwas the theory of Aristotle, which
declares that body and soul are merely a specific example of matter and
form. the common factors of all physical beings.
cannot exist apart from each other. each

bein~

Since matter and form

an incomplete substance

needing the other for existence, the unity of man's nature is affirmed
satisfactorily.

But if we accept this explanation we must justify another

important precept, the separation of the soul from the bocw. and the consequent immortality of the soul.

For if body and soul, as matter and form,

make up one complete substance, what will happen to the components of
that substance when it is destroyed?
The apparent indifference of Aristotle to the after life of man intensifies the problem for his followers.

Of the many attempts in the

Middle Ages to reconcile the teaching of Aristotle with religious

dogma~

that of Avicenna was one of the most influential.

This noted Arabian de-

clared30 that two points of view were possible with regard to the soul. In
the first place. it might be considered in itself. a spiritual
simple. indivisible. and consequently indestructible.

substance~

In its relation to

the body. however. the first and most fundamental of the functions it exercised was that of form.

Here is a combination of Plato and Aristotle;

the former speaks on the soul in itself, the latter on its informing the
body.

That this solution of the problem was deemed the final word on the

centuries-old question is obvious from the reception accorded it by such
men as Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure.

Even Albert the Great, the

admiring student of Aristotle. is in sympathy with such a fUsion of theories
stating, ".Animam considerando secundum se 1 consentiemus Platoni;
oonsiderando autem eam secundum formam animationis quam dat corpori. consentiemus Aristoteli." 31
But that this eclecticism is a futile attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable is evident.

It is impossible to consider the soul as the proper

form of the body and at the same time to define it in itself without reference to the body.

As long as its relation to

th~

body is not included in

its essence it must remain true that the union of soul and body is merely
accidental.

It does not remove the difficulty to say that it is natural

for the soul to inform the body1 or even that the soul has an inclination
toward the body. for in neither case is an explanation offered for the very
essential unity of man which Christian philosophy must recognize and which
it had long been seeking to justify.

The problem still remains to confirm

both the unity of man and the incorruptibility of his soul.
_,~_

For Plato, ot course, there is no question of the state of the soul
a,.fter it leaves the bodyJ

but he does not and can not explain haw a

creature which is an intrinsic part ot a natural universe should be compounded of elements so unnaturally suited to each other.

In the teaching

of Aristotle there are two main difficulties which call tor explanation.
In the first place, if the soul is the natural form of the body, and
11

there is no more need to enquire whether soul and body are one, any more

than whether the wax and imprint are one, n32 what becomes of the soul when
it is no longer one with the body?
tion that could be put to Aristotle.

This is probably the most obvious quesBut there is a problem which is more

subtle than this and more difficult of solution, one which concerns that
point of the Aristotelian theory which has always been the chief attraction
of Aristotelianism to philosophers defending the natural unity of man,
namely, the essential unity of the soul as the form of the body.
In general it would seem clear that in man the soul is the one, indivis-

ible source of all activity, whether vegetative, sensitive, or intellectual.
For
"knowledge and health are the shape and in same sort
.form, the notion and virtual actiVity, ot that whioh
is capable of receiving in the one case knowledge, in
the other health ••• Now the soul is that whereby primarily we live, perceive, and have understanding:
therefore it will be a species of notion or .form, not
matter or substratum.n33
Thus there is but one soul or form which is the principle of every operation

ot man.

But are there in this soul :DJ8.I1Y parts, each of which is the source

ot a particular activity, and which are separable tram one another?
Aristotle, although we shall later. discover some uncertainty in his stand,

appears to think not.

He oondenms the doctrine of those who attribute

the activities of' man, not to the whole soul, but to various parts of it.
"Some say that the soul is divisible, and that one
part of it thinks, another desires. What is it then
which holds the soul together, if naturally divisible?
Assuredly it is not the body: on the contrary, the
soul seems rather to hold the body together ••• If', then,
the unity of' the soul is due to some other thing, tha.t
other thing would be, properly speaking, soul. We shall
need, than, to repeat the enquiry respecting it also,
whether it is one or manifold. Folr, if' it has unity,
why not attribute unity to the soul itself at the outset?"34
It is not hard to understand why St. Thomas built his system on the
theories of Aristotle.

But the Greek philosopher is not always so definite

and unequivocal as a Christian philosopher would demand.

This indecision

is especially marked in the case of' the intellect and its relation to the
other powers of' the soul.

If the intellect comes from without, hOW' does

it become a form of' the body at all?

When _it departs tram the body, more-

over, it has received no distinguishing mark from its early sojourn, because it is entirely impassive.
leot

~hich

One wonders what peculiar right the intel-

makes everything" possesses that allows it to survive the disso-

lution of the body, while the intellect "which becomes everything" peri she~~
if the necessary qualification for immortality is immateriality.

The pos-

sible intellect is tully as immaterial as the acting intellect, for it can
receive the intelligible species illuminated and abstracted by the acting
intellect.

The only reason that might explain the destructibility of' the

possible intellect is that it is a part of the individual, the composite,
while the acting intellect is neither individual nor any part of the composite.

This explanation is supported by Aristotle's statement that in

the separated intellect there is neither memory nor love nor any other of
the characteristics which serve to distinguish one

i~dividual

from another.

This lack of concern for the destiny of the individual is emphasized by the
fact that

for Aristotle there is no individualization within a species

apart tram matter; the separated intellects would seem incapable of distinction, especially since they retain no mark of their union with the body.
These are some of the shortcomings in the Aristotelian treatment of the soul
which had to be reconciled and supplemented by st.Thamas.
IV. ST. THOMAS ON THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL

It was first necessary for St. Thomas, in discussing the soul, to set
forth its substantiality in more explicit terms than the haphazard references
of Aristotle, although the principle involved, as is usually the case in
St. Thomas, is Aristotelian.

The intellect has an activity which is pecu-

liar to it, and which it does not communicate to the body, namely, the
power to abstract forms f'rom matter and
material conditions.

of them apart !'rom their

t~

But nothing can act

E

_!!.unless it

exists~

_!!.1

for only that being has activity which is in act, and its acts in accordance with its mode of being.
ent.

The soul is therefore immaterial and subsist-

Moreover, man is capable or knowing through his intellect the natures

of all bodies. But if the intellect had itself the nature of same body, it
would not be able to know all bodies, because that which is material is by
that very fact limited in nature.
be a body.

For this reason the intellect cannot

Nor can it use a bodily organ, for the limited nature or that

organ would make it impossible for the intellect to know all bodiew.
the soul is proved to be a subsisting being. 36

Thus

Although it is subsisting 1 st. Thomas is careful to avoid the implications which Plato would give the term.

The error of thinkers previous to

St· Thomas was that they combined tWo complete substances and wondered why

they could not obtain one substance.
but not in its complete nature.

For St. Thomas the soul is subsisting,

To complete that nature it needs a body,

and, impelled by the desire of perfecting itself, it gives substantiality
to matter, so that whatever actuality there is in the composite is derived
from the soul.

In itself the soul is the weakest of intellectual beings,

for in the presence of pure intelligibles it perceives nothing.

Since the

only intelligibles within its reach are those which are darkened by matter,
it is necessary for the soul to unite itself to matter in order to get in
touch with them.

This it does by giving substantiality to matter in such a

way that a composite being is formed, but in the composite there is only
the substantiality given it by the soul.

Thus it is necessary for the soul

to be united to a body in order that it may attain the fullness of its nature, which originally is in potency to all intelligibles contained in
matter but actually possesses none.
subsist at all;

Without the soul, the body could not

without the body, the soul would remain blind.

Man,

therefore, is composed of a soul which, though subsisting, is an incomplete
substance, and a body which subsists only by virtue of its being informed
by the soul.

The essential unity of man is hereby defined and confirmed

with the clearness and finality far which Greek and Christian philosophers
had hitherto searched in vain. 3 7
V. THE INTELLECT AS FORM OF THE BODY

But haw can the intellect be united to the body as form?

Aristotle

r

called the intellect something apart. for that which is immaterial would

not seem capable of informing a body.

st. Thomas uses the authority of

Aristotle. not only to prove his point, but to set Aristotle himself aright.
Since Aristotle says that it is by means of the soul that man thinks. then
by calling the intellect a thing apart, he must have .meant. says St. Thomas,
that the intellect is not the act of a corporeal organ.

The ultimate prin-

ciple of a thing's activity is its form, because the form is its actuality.
and it acts only in so far as it is in act.

But the form of man, which is

the soul, must be the principle of the various activities performed by man.
such as nutrition. sensation, locomotion, and understanding.

If anyone were

to deny, then. that the intellectual soul is the form of the body, he could
not explain how understanding is the proper activity of this man. But that
this man possesses understanding and knows that it is he himself who under-

s~ands. is clear from ordinary experience. 38
If the intellectual soul is the form of the body, there must be an intellect for each individual. for it is impossible that many individuals
possess the same form.

Moreover, whenever we speak of one principal agent

and two instruments involved in an .operation, we say that there is one
agent and two actions.

!f, for example, a man touches different objects

with his two hands, there will be two sensations of touch but only one person who touches,

Thus if there is one intellect for two men, who are dis-

tinguished from each other in some other way, there will be only one act
of understanding and only one intelligent being.

Nor oan a diversity of

phantasms make the intellectual activity of one man distinct from that of
another.

The form of the possible intellect is not the phantasm, but rather

the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm.

But in one intellect

there is only one intelligible species abstracted from many different phantasms of the same species, as is clear in the case of a. man who has many
phantasms of stone, but only one intelligible species of stone which he has
abstracted from them.

By means of that one intelligible species he knows

the nature of stone despite the diversity of phantasms.

Thus a diversity

of phantasms would not cause a. diversity of intellectual operations in
several men who possessed among them but a single intellect.
39
accordingly, an individual intellect for each man.

We must admit,

But in man there are other operations than the merely intellectual.
How can these be reduced to a. single form as their principle, especially
since all the powers of the soul except the immaterial are of themselves
perishable?

It was on this account that the Franciscan school postulated

a multiplicity of substantial forms, fearing that the essential corruptibility of the vegetative and sensitive potencies compromised the incorruptibility of the soul from which they sprang. 40 St. Thomas gives an answer in
complete accord with the principles of Aristotle and with the Christian
tradition which sought in its philosophy for the unity of man that faith
had affirmed.

A multiplicity of forms in man would destroy the simple unity

of his nature, for a thing is simply one only by virtue of a single form
from which it derives its being.

If man, therefore, exercised the various

activities of his nature through different forms, he would not be simply
one.

For this reason Aristotle
"contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore inquirit,
quid contineat illas, id est quid faciat ex eis unum.
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Et non potest dici, quod uniantur per corporis unitatem:
quia magis anima continet corpus, et facit ipsum esse
unum, quam e converso. n41
Moreover, if a being were animal through one form, and man through another,
then animal could be predicated of man only accidentally 1 and man could not
truly be said to be that which was animal.

To avoid these absurdities all

the activities of man must be reduced to a single form as their principle.
Having refuted the arguments to the contrary, St. Thomas proceeds to
show how the intellectual soul contains within itself the lower powers of
man as their source.

All forms which are of different species are dis-

tinguished by the possession of greater or less perfection, as in the
order of nature the living is superior to the non-living, animals to plants,
and men to irrational animals.

Here St. Thomas employs the statements of

Aristotle that forms are like numbers, differing from one another by the
addition or subtraction of unity, and that different kinds of forms, are
like different figures, one of which

contain~

another and exceeds it.

In

the same manner the intellectual soul contains in its power whatever is
possessed by the sensitive souls of brutes and the nutritive souls of plants
"Siout ergo superficies quae habet figuram pentagonam,
non per aliwm figuram est tetragana, et per aliwm pentagona,
quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagana
continetur: ita nee per aliam animrum Socrates est homo,
et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eamdem. "42
St. Thomas replies very briefly but effectively to those who would require
a multiplicity of forms in man in order to safeguard the immortality of
his intellectual soul.

The sensitive soul does not possess incorruptibil-

ity of itself, but receives it because it is joined to the intellectual soul
which is incorruptible.

The soul, therefore, which is merely sensitive is

corruptible;

but that which has an intellectual together with a sensitive

principle is not corruptible.

For although the sensitive povrer does not

bestow incorruptibility. neither can it take it away from the intellectual
power to which it is joined. 43
VI. THE PRODUCTION OF THE SOUL

In the production of the human soul St. Thomas accepts two principles
of Aristotle.

The first is that the intellectual soul is not present in

the body from the beginning of the latter's existence.

The body at first

conbains a vegetative soul only. then a sensitive soul. and finally. when
the proper degree of development has been attained. the ultimate perfection
of form, the intellectual soul.

st. Thomas is careful to maintain. however.

that one form succeeds another by displacing it entirely. not by being
added to it in the composite. 44

Both Aristotle and st. Thomas hold• more-

over, that the intellectual soul must come to the body from outside. or,
as Aristotle says, "through the door." 45
inquire, can this have in Aristotle?

But what meaning, we are led to

It certainly can not refer to an act

of creation by God, because the God of Aristotle can produce nothing outside himself by an act of will;

being entirely independent of any creature.

he is deprived by Aristotle of the virtually transient activity to which
St. Thomas ascribes creation.

The intellect. Aristotle see.ms to say. is

exempt from birth as well as from deathJ

this would attribute to it a cer-

tain kind of preexistence, though, as Zeller says,46 in a rather impersonal
sense.

Again we are almost led to the conviction that Aristotle believes

the intellect to be nothing other than the divine spirit, or God. for it

r
seems to be eternal and impassive, and yet, in the system of Aristotle, it
can be neither an emanation tram, nor a creation. of, God.

But to call the

acting intellect God could be reconciled only with difficulty to Aristotle's
belief in the infinitely transcendental nature of God's operations; for,
after all, the intellect is, in some obscure sense at least .. a part of the
individual soul.
It is clear,. at any rate, that Aristotle never even remotely speaks of
the creation of the soul, and seems to regard its origin as insoluble. 47
But this would never do for St. ThO:m.as, who had before him the Scriptural
account of the creation of all things by God, and the creation, in particular, of man:

"Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam.n

48

Since the hunan

soul is subsisting, unlike the forms of other material things, it must be
created.

The basic reason for this is that the becoming of anything, since

it is the means whereby the thing
ity with the mode of existence.

reoeives existence, must be in conformSince non-subsisting forms exist only by

virtue of the existence of the composite, existence and becoming cannot be
attributed to them in the full sense of the term,. for they become only because the subsisting composites become of which they are s. part.

But the

rational soul; being a subsisting thing, can be said properly both to exist and to became.

But it cannot be produced out of any substrate, whether

material, because it is an immaterial being, or spiritual, because spiritual
substances cannot be generated, that is,. receive a new substantial form.
It is necessary,. accordingly, for the soul to be created. 49
Since the origin of the soul is brought about by creation, it is the

result of an immediate act of God.

Not even an angel can create, because

the action of any creature always presupposes something already existing
which can be transmuted.

Only God, Who is the cause of being universally,

can produce being from nothingness. SO

In reply to those early Fathers who

for various reasons held that the soul was created before the body,
St.Thomas employs an argument which, though Aristotelian, Aristotle had
neglected to remember.
before the imperfect.

In the universal order of nature the perfect comes
But the soul is by itself an incomplete S'..tbstance,

and needs the body to perfect its nature.

Since God created all things in

the entire perfection demanded by their species, He must have created the
soul together with the body, since it is only a part of the human composite
and without the body has not its natural perfection. 51

Here st. Thomas

departs from the tradition of St. Augustine, whose teaching on this point
is in conformity with his definition of the soul as a complete nature in
itself.

St. Thomas' doctrine of creation, not only of the soul, but of

being in general, is such a decided advance on Aristotle that its importance
cannot be overestimated.

The full impart of creation may be realized only

by considering it in relation to the final end of man, and in this respect
the philosophy of Aristotle is notably deficient. 52
Thus far st. Thomas has established the unity of the soul which Aristotle had aimed at but failed to reach.

In general Aristotle is very clear

about the unity and simplicity of the soul, because it is in accord with
his cosmology that the unifying principle in any composite is the form.
But in the oase of the human form the power of intellectual activity of
which man is capable cannot be explained in -terms of an ordinary composite

r
being, since there is no material element involved.

Although Aristotle

realized far better than Plato that man is essentially bound up in a material universe, he could not comprehend how the spiritual element in man is
an intrinsic part of his nature, for it seemed to him too far above the
human sphere of existence.

Although man partakes in the divinity through

his intellect, that activity is not altogether natural to him; it is more
than hwnan.
" ••• such a life would be better than man could attain
to; for he would live thus, not so far forth as he is
man, but as there is in him something divine. But so
far as this divine part surpasses the whole compound
nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy which
is according to all other virtue. If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the life also.,
which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life.n53
To explain how an immaterial activity which of its nature shows divine influence is an essential part of the substantiality of a being composed of
matter and form, although he would have liked to regard it as that, seems
to have been beyond the powers of Aristotle.
St. Thomas has shown how the intellectual soul is the natural form of
man, and contains virtually within itself the lower pCWiers.

He has estab-

lished its right to be the substantial form of the body, indeed, the very
command of its nature to be such a form.

This is merely carrying Aristotle's

principles to their logical conclusion, and, mor'eover, on a strictly natural planeJ

St. Thomas finds no need of baptizing Aristotle in order to

utilize his teachings.

It is an instance of one philosopher building upon

the foundation of another, but remodeling that foundation in order to
erect a more stable superstruoture.54
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VII. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Aristotle had declared that the intellect is

i~~ortal.

St. Thomas

proves. as Aristotle could not. that the intellect is part of the soul. an
inseparable part. since the soul is simple.
immortal. 55

Therefore. the soul must be

This is the essence of St. Thomas' doctrine on the immortality

of the soul; although both premises of the syllogism are

Aristotelian~

Aristotle could not arrive at the obvious conclusion because he did not
realize the full import of the premises.

Soma of the other

ar~nts

em-

ployed by St. Thomas may also be mentioned in order that we may sea how
Aristotle has been carried to lengths he had not dreamed of 6 yet with which
he would not have disagreed.
\Vhatever pertains to anything essentially cannot be taken away from it 6
as, for example. animality from a man.

It is clear that being pertains to

the form, for anything that has being possesses it by virtue of its proper
form 6 so that being can in no way be taken from the form.

A composite

being perishes by losing the form whence it derives its being.
does not perish .E!!:.

~·

But the form

With the destruction of the ccmposite and the being

which was brought about by the form, the form may

perish~

accidens if

i~

is such that it has not its own being but only the pONer of g1 ving being
to a composite.

But if there is a form which has its own being. it must of

necessity be incorruptible.

For being cannot be taken from that which has

its being unless its form be separated from it;

but if that which has its

being is the form itself 6 that being cannot be separated from it.

We haw

already seen that the human soul is a subsisting being, that it is a form
possessing its own being, and not merely the power of giving being to a
-25-

composite.

Accordingly. we must say that neither per..!.! nor .E!!: accidens

is the soul corruptible. 56
The influence of Aristotle may be noted to a lesser extent than that
of Plato in another proof adduced by St. Thomas.

Nothing suffers destruc-

tion from that in which it has its perfection. for
tion are contrary states.

perfect~on

and destruc-

But the perfection of the soul consists in a cer

tain abstraction or withdrawing fran the body, in which the soul is perfeoted both in knowledge and in virtue.

The knowledge of the soul becomes

greater as it is led to consider objects which are more immaterial. Virtue
consists in refusing to give way to the passions, and in modifYing them
and holding the.m in check.

Since both of these perfections de.mand a kind

of separation from the body• there can be no destruction of the soul because of a complete separation from the body at death.

It cannot be ob-

jected that, while the perfection of the soul is brought about by a separation from the boqy in its mode of operation, its destruction consists in
a separation according to its being.

The operation of a thing de.monstrates

its substance and its very being, for the proper
lows its proper nature.

operation~

a thing fol-

This means that the operation of a thing cannot

be perfected unless the nature or substance is perfected.

Consequently,

if the operation of the soul receives greater perfection in being separated
from the body, its nature certainly will not suffer destruction in such
a separation. 57

From the nature of the possible intellect, which St. Thomas naturally
believes a part of the soul, the immortality of the soul may also be
-26-
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demonstrated.

Since that which is received into anything else is received

according to the nature of the recipient, the incorruptibility of the possible intellect may be proved f'rom the f'aot that it receives the forms of
things in so far as these forms are actually intelligible.

But they are

actually intelligible only because they are immaterial and universal, and
consequently incorruptible.

The existence of these incorruptible forms in

the possible intellect demonstrates the incorruptibility of the possible
intellect and of the soul of which it is a part.58

This is St. Thomas'

answer to the declaration of Aristotle that the possible intellect, being
passive, is perishable.

59

It is indeed perplexing why Aristotle had de-

clared the possible intellect corruptible 6 even though he realized that it
is immaterial.

The argument of St. Thomas on this point is supported by

his strong defense of intellectual memory.

Avicenna had denied intellec-

tual memory, saying that sense memory is possible only because of the preservation of the sensible species.

But the intellect, being without a

corporeal organ, cannot preserve the intelligible species, because that
which is in the intellect through its species must be present only when
the. intellect is in act.

St. Thomas, on the contrary, refers to his f'Unda-

mental principle that whatever is received by anything is received accoraing to the mode of the recipient.

But the intellect is far more stable

and immobile than any sense faculty could be.

If, then 6 the sensitive

powers can retain the sensible species apart from the actual apprehension
of the object, so much more should the intellect be able to preserve the
intelligible species. 60 Applying this reasoning to the argument for the
incorruptibility of the soul, st. Thomas makes it more evident that the
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possible intellect is not perishable, since it can not only receive the
forms of objects immaterially but also retain those forms.

There seems to

be little explanation of Aristotle's position on the question, unless we
attribute it to his indifference toward the continuance of the individual
personality, which he often appears to place in the possible intellect,
or accept the theory of Avicenna that the possible intellect must turn to
the acting intellect, which is separate from the individual and one for all
n:.en, whenever it wishes to receive the intelligible species which the act-

ing intellect has already abstracted and stored away.
The inunortality of the soul is so essential to the system of st.Thoma.s,
as to any Christian philosophy. that he demonstrates it in every possible
manner.

Having set forth as :rn.a.ey- metaphysical proofs as he can muster • he

finds place for a demonstration which, although it lacks the absolute
finality of the others, utilizes a truth of the moral order that may be even
more convincing because it is less abstract.

Both St. Thomas and

insist that there is no natural appetite which exists in vain.

}~istotle

Pxistotle

did not apply this principle to the universal desire of men for immortality;
but St. Thomas, deeming the fUture life of even more importance than the
present, does not let the opportunity pass.

Since, in the case of those

beings which can have knowledge, conscious appetite is proportioned to
apprehension, man, who has for the .object of his knowledge being universally and simply6 desires to possess being always.

He does not apprehend

being conditioned by space and time,as do irrational animals.

If this

appetite of man is not to remain unfulfilled, the soul of man must be
immorta1. 61

VIII.

THE SEPARATED SOUL

If the soul is to have an existence after its departure from the body 1
the requirements of that existence must be considered.

That the soul

will be much more than an intellect which is always thinking but has
neither the means of thinking nor anything to think about. as Aristotle has
described it 1 is evident from the nature of the soul as St.Thomas has already set it forth.

In discussing the separated soul many of the implioa-

tions of the thomistic theory are brought to light for the first time.
For Plato and St. Augustine the soul on departing from the body entered
the fullness of its spiritual life, no longer bound down by its earthly com·
panion.

But for St.Thomas the soul without the body is not in its natural

state, and its mode of operation apart from the body demands much care on
his part.

62

The potencies of the separated soul 6 the powers which it can

exercise. especially its capacity for obtaining knowledge. and finally the
individuality it possesses when separated from the matter by which it was
individualized. all require of St. Thomas extreme delicacy of treatment.
in which Aristotle is of little assistance.
Although all the determinations of the human composite and all its
substantiality are derived from the soul as their principle. not all the
potencies of the soul have the soul as their subject.

The vegetative and

sensitive potencies of their very nature require a body for their operation
For this reason St. Thomas is very severe with those who hold that in the
separated soul such potencies as these can be actualized• or even that they
exist in the s~parated soul in any way except virtually. 63 We must note 6

however, that the vegetative and sensitive potencies do not perish at death
as though they belonged to the body, while the intellect, being apart from
a corporeal organ, survives.

This is the very situation in which Aristotle

apparently forgets his stand on the unity of the soul.
"But we must examine whether any form also survives
afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this; e.g. the soul may be of this sort--not all
soul but the reason; for presumably it is impossible
that all soul should survive."64
On the other hand, it may be possible to understand Aristotle as we do
St. Thomas, as saying that no part of the soul perishes in the strict sense
of the word, but that some potencies exist in the separated soul only
virtually.

Aristotle is not very explicit on this point, but other passages

especially those in which he alienates the acting intellect from the rest
of the soul, make his doctrine questionable.
Aristotle sometimes stresses the physical conditions of purely spiritual
activities to the extent of making them appear intrinsically necessary to
65
those activities.
This is perhaps the reason for his denying love and
memory, for example, to the separated intellect.

St. Thomas has difficulty

in explaining the activities of the separated soul because in his system
separation from the body is beyond the nature of the soul, though not contrary to it.

The soul when joined to the body exercises knowledge by

making use of the phantasms which the sense faculties provide • vVhen
separated from the body, however, it bas no phantasms, but it is then able
to understand pure intelligibles ·with the aid of infused species, as do
the other spiritual

~ubstances.

But St. Thomas has to admit that the

soul's knowledge under such conditions is imperfect.

Although in general

it is a higher form of knowledge to apprehend the intelligible directly,
still this method is imperfect in the case of the soul, to which abstraction
from phantasms is natural.

For the more perfect spiritual substances can

have very clear knowledge through the medium of a few forms, since they
possess higher powers of understanding than man.

But the human soul, being

the weakest of spiritual substances, needs many more forms in order to have
a sufficiently clear knowledge of reality, and these it can obtain only
through union with a body and_ the use of phantasms.

Since, therefore, it

possesses but few forms when able to apprehend intelligibles directly, its
knowledge will be general and confused. 66

But in addition to such knowledge

as the soul may thus acquire, it will possess the intelligible species
which it received while joined to the body, and whatever knowledge God may
grant it through the enlightenment of divine grace. 67
IX.

INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY

The chief difficulty in many ways with the Aristotelian treatment of
the soul, or of man in general, is the slight and rarely manifested interest in the destiny of the individual.

While Plato subordinated the indi-

vidual man to the Idea of Man, the philosophy of Aristot16 would seem to
raise the position of the individual by denying to the universal subsistence
outside the individual.

But, though he looks continually to the :f'ut.ure,

Aristotle is thinking only of the species, 68 a fact which makes his system
of ethics almost

pointle~s

and without much ground in reality.

This atti-

tude is reflected in the individuality which Aristotle allows each man
and the soul when it has been separated from the body.
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For Aristotle the principle of individuation is matter;
difference between forms of the same species.

there is no

But how can matter, in so

far as it is matter, be the ground of individuation, since of itself matter
. is formless and indeterminate?

It is difficult to see how a form which is

of itself universal can be united to matter which is of itself indeterminate in such a way that many individuals of the same species will result.

On the other hand, even if Aristotle had succeeded in obtaining a multi. plicity of individuals by joining the same specific form to various portions
of matter, what would become of the distinction between these individual
forms when they were separated from matter?

Apart from matter one form

shm1ld be identical with every other of the same species.

Both these ques-

tions St. Thomas finds it necessary to anmrer in order to secure the individuality of the separated soul and also of the soul as it exists in the
body~

The principle of individuation for St. Thomas is matter, not matter in
general. but materia signata quantitate, matter which has, as it were, been
earmarked. and assigned to a certain space which it holds to the exclusion
of allother matter.

The fact that a form actualizes a definite quantity

of matter distinguishes it from every other formwhich is specifically like
it. 69

But .it must not be thought that there first exists a diversity of

matter for which a diversity of forms is created.

On

the contrary, matter

is inferior to farm, and exists for the sake of form, rather than converse.
ly. 70

In the same sense, then, that matter is the principle of individ-

uation. it is also the ground of individuality.

But if we define an in-

dividual as a being which is distinct fran all other beings and is itself

,..

indivisible into other beings, individuality consists, not in matter, but
in the concrete substance taken as a whole.

The matter is individuating

only by virtue of its integration with the being of the substance, and.
since the being of the substance is nothing more than the being given it
by the form. individuality must be a property of the form as much as it is
of the matter.

Strictly

speaking, individuality would seem to pertain

more to the form than to the matter, because all the substantiality of the
composite which is individual is derived from the form.

"On pourrait dire

que c'est bien la matiere qui individualise la forme. mais que, une fois
individualisee. c'est bien la forme qui est individuelle." 71

The form

as such, however • is not individual unless it has been individualized in
matter.

Thus St. Thomas avoids a reproach often directed against Aristotle,

that the differences between individuals in a species are only accidental.
For st. Thomas the very form is individual, but only. of course. when it
has been individualized by a definite quantity of matter.
Aristotle says that
"it is the most natural function in all living things.
if perfect and not defective or spontaneously generated,
to reproduce their species; animal producing animal and
plant plant. in order that they may. so far as they can.
share in the eternal and the divine. For it is that
which all things yearn ~f'ter, and that is the final cause
of all their natural aotivity ••• Since, then, individual
things are incapable of sharing continuously in the
eternal and the divine, because nothing in the world of
perishables can abide numerically one and the same, they
partake in the eternal and divine, each in the onlyway
it oa.n. same more, some less. That is to say, each persists. though not in itself. yet in a representatiVe,
which is specifically, not numerically, one with it.n72

r
'

Aristotle is very open to the suspicion that such a statement applies to
men as well as to other material beings, because for him the
individual is submerged in that of the species.

dest~

of the

The individual is born,

lives for a short time, and disappears forever without leaving a trace behind him.

But what difference, as long as the species endures?

other in-

dividuals will come to take his place, and they in their turn will be replaced by others.

The species can subsist only in the individuals, but the

individual passes and the species endures.
st. Thomas does not underestimate the importance of the species, but
his primary concern, in the case of man at least, is for the individual.
Since the various species are different grades of perfection in the representation of the divine essence, God must provide for the continuance of
each species in accordance with His purpose in establishing it in the divine plan.

Thus there need be only one individual in each species among

incorruptible beings, but for the conservation of the species among corruptible beings there must be many individuals in a species. 73
corruptible beings man is a case apart.

But among

For his soul subsists and has a

destiny when separated from the body that philosophy must recognize.

The

species, of course, endures because it subsists in many individuals, but the
individual man also endures because his soul is immortal.

Thus the princi-

pal intention of nature with regard to man is less for the species than

for the individual.

St. Thomas is able to make this decided improvement

on Aristotle not only because of his doctrine of ilmnortality but also because of his concept of creation.

Since the incorruptible part of man's

nature is the soul, which is the result of the direct creation of God,

we may say that the intention of the author of nature is manifested in the
multiplication of man in the species and in the immortality of the individual soul.
"Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio;
ex parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, campetit
ei quod multitude individuorum sit per se intenta a
natura, vel potius a naturae auctore, qui solus est
humanarum animarum creator."74
Since the form upon becoming individualized in matter receives an individuality that is owing less to the matter than to the substance of the
composite, which itself receives its substantiality from the form, St.
Thomas can readily explain the distinction of souls when they have been
separated tram the body.

For it is not every diversity of form that con-

stitutes a difference of species.

The multiplicity of separated souls

follows, not from a difference in the formal constitution of the souls,
but from a diversity of substance.

The substance of this soul is different

from the substance of every other soul.

This difference of substance does

not proceed from a difference in the essential principles of the souls but
fran their being canmensurate with different bodies.

These conunensurations

remain in the souls even after their bodies have perished, just as the very
substance of the souls remains.
is the form of a particular body;

Every soul according to its very substance
otherwise it would be united only acci-

dentally to the body, and the union of soul and body would be a unity not

E.!! but per accidens.

In so far as the soul is a form it is commensur-

ate to a body, and since the substantiality of the composite by which the
soul is individualized is the substantiality given it by the soul, this
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individual substantiality remains in the soul even after it has left the
body. 75
Although it is true that in every species of material beings there are

.

individuals, still the individual man has a very particular significance
which the others lack.

The laws of the universe fall upon all classes of

being, but in a different manner.

The inorganic world is so governed by

these laws that it neither cooperates with nor reacts to them.

Among plants

and irrational animals, especially the latter, there is a reaction to the
laws of nature;

but this reaction is determined in each case by the action

which the being suffers, so that St.John Damascene well says of
"nan agunt sed magis aguntur. 11

animals~

Man, on the other hand, being possessed of

reason and the power of free' choice, cooperates with God in carrying out
the plan of the universe and attaining his own destiny.

It was Christian

philosophy which distinguished the individual man from the members of other
species by giving him the name of "person."

It is in the De Duabus Naturis

of Boethius that we find the definition of person which was accepted by
the philosophers of the Middle Ages:

"Persona est rationalis natura

individua substantia. 1176 The soul of man is the principle of rationality
and liberty, and also of his individual substantiality.

Thus it is his

soul which elevates him to the dignity of person, and it is the basis of
the personality which is such an inseparable part of his nature.

The man

of st. Thomas and of Christian philosophy possesses a far greater dignity
in the universe than that of

Aristotle~

for it is his privilege to cooper-

ate with God by directing himself toward his ultimate end.
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X.

THE SOUL IN THE HIERARCHY OF BEING

It is significant that in his synthesis of philosophy and theology, the
Summa Theologica, St.Thomas proceeds from the discussion of being in general
to that of the various kinds of being and their activities.

It was his fir.m

conviction that the proper operations of any olass of being are determined
by its position in the general scheme of the universe, in what has been
called the hierarchy of being.

Since the creative act of God flows uniform-

ly through all creatures as they proceed from it in diminishing perfection,
there are no gaps between the various grades of creatures.

"Supremum enim

inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris.n77
a hierarchy is Neoplatonic in origin:
another except through a medium.

The idea of

nothing passes from one extreme to

But st. Thomas does not use the hierarchy

merely for the sake of symmetry or design in the intricate convolutions of
his system.

Since every operation is the realization of an essence and

every essence is a certain degree of perfection in the divine plan, the
operations of any baing will indicate its proper place in the universal hie
arehy of being.

On the other hand, once we have given a being its position

in the hierarchy its particular nature and activities will be made more
clear when we have compared it to other ranks in the hierarchy.
The Aristotelian principle that all knowledge begins with sense is

thus given new meaning in st. Thomas.

Since the mode of knowledge of any

being follows its mode of existence, we may distinguish three grades of
knowledge among creatures.

Sense is the act of a bodily organ, and is

consequently concerned with forms as they exist in matter.

But there is a

power of knowing which is neither the act of a bodily organ nor connected
in any way with matter, namely, the angelic intellect, which has for its
object forms subsisting without matter.

The intellect of man is midway be-

tween these two, for it is not the act of a bodily organ, but it is a faculty of his soul, which is the form of a body.

Thus the object of the human

intellect is the form existing in matter, not as it exists in matter, however, but as it is abstracted from matter and all material conditions.78
Being on the border line between the spiritual and the material, man shares
in the activities of both; he is truly a creature of two worlds.
XI.

79

THE ACTUJG INTELLECT

Having a clearer concept of the position of man in the universe, and
especially of his relation to God, St. Thomas is far more definite than
Aristotle on such questions as the nature of the ac·bing intellect.
proved that the intellectual soul must be the form of the body.

He has

But there

is an urgent reason, in addition, why the acting intellect should be a part
of the individual soul and not a separate entity which is one for all men.
In demonstrating that each man possesses an acting intellect, St. ·Thomas
not only resolves the indecision of Aristotle, who was interpreted very unfavorably on this point by the Arabians, but also renders unnecessary the
theory of illumination advanced by St. Augustine.
It is true, says St. Thomas, that there is a separate intellect from
which man derives his faculty of knowledge.

For whenever there is anything

which has a participated being, and is mobile and imperfect, there exists
prior to it something which is its awn being, and is immobile and perfect.

But the intellect of man merely participates in the power of intelligence,
since not the entire soul is intellectual, but only a faculty of it; man's
kn~rledge

is acquired by the process of reason, which is a kind of motion;

and that knowledge is imperfect, for it proceeds from potency to act and is
always limited.

Thus there must be an intellect higher than that of man

from which the human intellect derives its power of kncwr.ing.

But this in-

tellect we call God, Vfho is the creator of the soul and in vVham alone the
soul will find perfect happiness.

But we must also place in man a power

received from God by which his intellect

~enders

potential intelligibles

actually intelligible, for in all perfect natural beings there are powers
proper to the individuals, p<M'ers which they have received from the universal causes.

There is nothing in nature, however, which is equal in dignity

to the human soul, and it is fitting, therefore, that it possess a power
derived from the universal cause of intelligence by which it can abstract
intelligible species from phantasms.

For this is a power which is most

proper to its nature, and God cannot deny what is required by the essence
of a being.

80

St. Augustine, in postulating direct illumination of the

soul by God in the act of intellectual knowledge, deprived man of the
activity which makes him most godlike, thinking perhaps that he glorified
God

qy

not allowing man to participate in this most worthy of all posses-

sions. But the God of St. Thomas is more generous, as it were, for he
grants man this power in accordance with the demands ~f his nature.al
St. Thomas makes a concession to st. Augustine, however, by accepting his
doctrine

that man knows in the divine reasons.

But he is more explicit

than St. Augustine in his denial of man's ability during this life to know

the divine reasons in themselves.

The intellect of man, since it is a par-

ticipation of the uncreated light of the divine intellect, in which are contained the eternal reasons of all'things, may be said to have all its knowledge in the divine reasons.
Quis ostendit nobis bona?'

"Unde in Psal. IV, 6, dicitur:

'1~lti

dicunt:

Cui quaestioni Psalmista respondet dicens:

'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine. 11182
XII. CONCLUSION: ST. THOMAS AND REVELATION
If we were to inquire why St. Thomas makes such a notable advance· on
Aristotle in his treatment of the soul, we should be obliged to admit that
his greatest assistance was the Christian Revelation.

83

The God of Aris-

totle is not the creator or efficient cause of the universe, and consequent-

ly

in the philosophy of Aristotle there is no Providence.

The universe, it

is true, moves taward God as its final cause, but this is without any goveriJ._
ment or cooperation on the part of God.

With the concept of creation de-

rived from Revelation Christian philosophy possesses a God Who is intensely
interested in a universe that is progressing in accordance with His eternal
plan.

The God of Christianity is an efficient as well as a final cause.

Because God oan have no end outside Himself Aristotle rightly denied any
but an immanent activity to Him.
lifu~nent

fut in Christian thought God, through an

though virtually transient aotivity, produces a reality outside

Himself because He is the end of creation and the production of creatures
is the result of His Love for Himself and His desire to extend His goodness
to creatures.

Whereas the God of Aristotle moves the universe by being

loved, that of St. Thomas moves it by loving.

This relation of the creature to the creator has a pronounced influence
on the thomistic treatment of the soul.

In the philosophy of Aristotle we

have a doctrine of the soul which suggests and forms the basis of the complate and consistent teaching of st. Thomas.

St. Thomas demonstrates con-

vincingly the unity of man's nature and the immortality of his soul by
showing haw the intellect can be both a substance and the natural form of
the body.

He insists upon the supremacy of man in nature by justifying his

individuality and personality.
more than this.

But for St. Thomas the soul impl'ies much

It is his soul which makes man an "image" of God, as dis-

tinguished from other creatures which, as effects of God's power, are mere84
ly 11 vestigesn.
Because of his soul the life of man is a journey to God,
in r'Vhom the ultimate and perfect happiness of man consists.

The dignity of

the human person, his dominion over the universe, and his supernatural end.
all of which have their source in Revelation, are reflected in the philosophy of St. Thomas.

For this reason he is able to bring the principles of

Aristotle to a logical and satisfactory conclusion, privileged as he is to
judge the natural life of man in the light of the supernatural and give it
thereby its full significance. 85

In the things which pertain to this \Vorld

he is a follower of Aristotle. 86

But there is another world to which he

'

also turns his gaze. saying with st. Augustine,

11

Fecisti nos ad te,et

inquietum est cor nostrum, donee requiescat in te. n8'7

A,--
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